The article provides an overview of the interaction between quantification and information-structural properties, especially focus, givenness, and topic. After a short introduction into the nature of quantification, it covers the main areas where such interactions have been identified in the last thirty years in adverbial quantification and in nominal (oder determiner) quantification. It also discusses cases in which the quantifier itself is topical, given, or focused.
The examples in (1) differ in their truth conditions. So, why have a chapter on quantification in this handbook, as information structure is concerned with the way how information is presented, or "packaged," in the sense of Chafe 1976? Because the marking devices of information-structural features like focus, givenness, and topic influence the interpretation of quantificational clauses (cf. Partee 1991 , Partee, 1999 . This can be seen best with a type of quantification not expressed by determiners (called D-quantification), but by adverbial quantifiers like always, generic sentences, or modal operators like must (called A-quantification; cf. Bach et al. 1995) . In the following example, the stress pattern, normally expressing focus, leads to truth-conditional differences.
(3) a. Always, a black die is LOADED. ⟦black die⟧ ⊆ ⟦loaded⟧ b. Always, a BLACK die is loaded.
⟦loaded⟧ ⊆ ⟦black die⟧
The effects of stress in quantificational statements have been observed by various authors. Halliday 1970 noticed it with modal statements. The warning sign Dogs must be carried gets the unintended reading that the escalator is only for dog-holders with stress on dogs. Sgall e.a. 1987 pointed it out for clauses with frequency adverbials, as in Londoners most often go to Brighton, which gets different truth conditions with stress on LONDONERS ('all Brighton visitors are Londoners') or BRIGHTON ('all visits by Londoners are to Brighton'). Krifka e.a. 1995 attended to ambiguities in generic sentences as in Typhoons arise in the Pacific, which are a generic statement about typhoons with stress on PACIFIC, and about the Pacific with stress on TYPHOONS (cf. also Cohen & Erteschik-Shir 2002) .
There is one important finding of generalized quantifier theory that will play an important role, conservativity. According to Keenan & Stavi 1986 , it is sufficient for judging the truth of a D-quantificational statement to consider the entities in the restrictor, which is given by the NP argument. For (1), it is sufficient to check the black dice; other entities such as the white dice or the roulette wheels are irrelevant. The restrictor indicates the entities that the sentence is about (here, the black dice). This corresponds to the notion of topic, whereas the nuclear scope corresponds to the notion of comment.
With D-quantifiers, the syntactic structure [[ DP D NP] VP] indicates how the clause should be evaluated: NP is the restrictor, VP the nuclear scope, and D expresses the relation between restrictor and nuclear scope. With A-quantifiers as in (3), the identification of restrictor and nuclear scope is supported by prosodic means or syntactic movement, like scrambling, see below. Configurations of quantifier, restrictor and nuclear scope have been called tripartite structures by Partee 1981 and Heim 1982. There are certain phenomena relating to quantification that are treated in other articles of this handbook. In particular, Chapter 12 treats particles like only, also and even that have quantificational force. And Chapter 3 treats phenomena relating to definite and indefinite DPs that have quantificational effects on the level of discourse.
Information Structure in A-Quantification

Focus Effects in a Situation-Based Theory
Adverbial quantifiers, as observed in (3), have been analyzed as quantifying over times, cases, or situations (cf. e.g. Lewis 1975 The regular and the focus meaning of (5) without always are as follows: This represents the intended reading, but at the price of assuming different ways in which adverbial quantifiers are interpreted: In (4) the restrictor is provided by a whenclause, in (5)/(6) by the focus meaning.
Focus Effects Mediated via Context
Starting with Rooth 1992, focus effects were seen as mediated through context, thus leading to an overall more restrictive theory of how focus influences interpretation; von Fintel 1994 carried this out for A-quantification. Previous work by Kasper 1987 , Schubert & Pelletier 1987 , and Berman 1989 had suggested that the presuppositions of a clause form the restrictor of an A-quantifier. This is illustrated by (10), where hit the target presupposes that the subject aims and shoots at a target.
(10) Robin Hood always hits the target.
{s | RH aims and shoots at a target in s} ⊆ {s | RH hits the target in s} Presupposition is a form of givenness, an information-structural notion (Chapter 7). The focus structure gives a linguistic clue about the kinds of situation talked about, which in turn influences quantificational statements. Von Fintel takes up a device introduced by Rooth 1992 for context-sensitivity: The alternatives at the propositional level that are introduced by focus restrict a contextual parameter C, which is related to the clause by a squiggle operator ~:
C is interpreted as a subset of the focus alternatives ⟦φ⟧ f (von Fintel also requires that ⟦φ⟧ and at least one other element must be in ⟦C⟧). C is further constrained by the presuppositions of the clause, by a when-clause, or by the discourse topic of the sentence. With adverbial quantification, C determines the restrictor. Consequently, focus is just one of the factors restricting the domain of quantification. Consider (12) The resulting picture then is as follows: Quantification depends on a given set of situations, and the presuppositions within the quantified sentence corresponds to that set of given situations. Focus in turn helps to determine the presuppositions of the sentence, by the union over the alternatives of the focus. We do not have to stipulate a direct relation between quantification and focus.
The Requantification Problem
Von Fintel 1994 notices a problem with quantification over situations which arises with indefinite DPs. Consider (15).
We understand this as: When a cowboy chews something, he chews tobacco. But the representation given actually states: For any situation s, if there is a cowboy that chews something in s, then there is a cowboy (potentially another one!) that chews tobacco in s. For this, a situation s would constitute a positive instance in which one cowboy chews tobacco, and nine others chew bubble gum. We cannot achieve binding between the x in the restrictor and the x in the scope. This is the requantification problem.
Von Fintel 1994 suggests that we quantify over minimal situations in the restrictor and in the scope (cf. also Berman 1987 , Heim 1990 , Elbourne, 2005 : Each minimal situation s in which a cowboy smokes something is a minimal situation in which a cowboy smokes tobacco. This strategy gives us the right truth conditions. But it enforces to assume identity between the two cats in (16): (16) Always, if a cat is hungry, a cat cries.
This interpretation might be possible (von Fintel discusses examples like Show me a man who plays hard and I show you a man who deserves a beer).
But clearly, (16) invites the reading 'If a cat x is hungry, then there is a distinct cat y such that y cries'.
The problem does not go away in a dynamic framework that is designed to capture the introduction and uptake of discourse referents, such as Heim 1982 or Kamp 1981 . If we adapt the interpretation rules for focus and A-quantifiers to such a framework, as in Rooth 1995, then a cowboy in the scope in (15) would require the introduction of a novel discourse referent, leading to the wrong interpretation. Rooth's solution is to relax the novelty condition and allow for the index to be in the input meaning. However, this creates problems in cases like (16), where we actually want the indefinite DP in the scope to come with the novelty condition.
Hinterwimmer & Schueler 2012 propose that sentences like (15) are not about situations, but events. As the participants have unique roles in events, we do not need any reference to minimal situations: For any event e of chewing, there is a unique agent, and hence the agent of the event in the restrictor and the agent of the event in the scope must be the same. (16) is different: There are two clauses, which allows for the agent of the first event (being hungry) and the agent of the second (crying) to be different. Hinterwimmer & Schueler 2012 also discuss (17)(a) in which the indefinite DP in the scope is interpreted as co-referent with the indefinite DP in the restrictor, in contrast to (b).
(17) a. When Alan PRAISES a student, he always praises a SMART student. b. When Alan talks to a student, he always PRAISES a student.
They argue that in case the predicate in the restrictor and the scope is the same, as praise in (17)(a), there is a tendency that they pick out the same event; this is not the case if the predicates are different, as in (b). In addition, as the descriptive part of the indefinite in the scope is partly novel in (a), the speaker could not use a pronoun or a definite description, and so there is no pragmatic inference that the two entities are distinct.
Givenness in a Representation based on Discourse Referents
Chierchia 1995 and Krifka 2001a propose that it is givenness, not focus, which affects adverbial quantification. They analyze the accentual pattern of (15) as the result of deaccentuation of a cowboy.
The contextual effects of adverbial quantification discussed in 13.2.2 can be explained in terms of givenness, as it is inversely related to focus (cf. Schwarzschild 1999). Krifka argues that this solves the requantification problem if we assume that adverbial quantification involves discourse referents anchored to entities. Givenness implies that the entity referred to is already present in the context (cf. Chapter 3). Now, the discourse referent of a given indefinite as in (18) is obviously not present, as then a pronoun or definite DP would have been used. Krifka calls such indefinites non-novel, and assumes that they trigger accommodation of a context in which they are given. The quantifier always then states that each way in which the context can be accommodated makes the sentence true.
(19) Every way in which the context can be accommodated such that [a cowboy] G,i smokes tobacco can be interpreted, -i.e. every way to anchor a discourse referent i to some cowboy or other, is also a way that makes the sentence [a cowboy] G,j smokes tobacco is true, -i.e. it also holds that i is anchored to a cowboy that smokes tobacco.
For support of the givenness analysis, Krifka points out that non-novel indefinites can be marked by the word given, and that they carry other givenness markings, e.g. they are marked as topics in Japanese. 
Information Structure in D-quantification
D-Quantification over Situations
While information-structure effect have been initially discussed with A-quantification, they also affect sentences with D-quantification. Krifka 1990 discusses D-quantifiers that involve quantification over events as in (25) This cannot simply be understood as a quantification over cars that Ludwig washed: If Ludwig has 10 cars and washes 6 once with X-Polish, and washes 2 others 50 times with another product, (28) is not an appropriate description. It is also not just the washing events that count: If Ludwig washes one of his cars 50 times with X-polish, and 6 of it once with some other product, (28) does not seem to be true either. Eckardt suggests that such sentences suggest a one-to-one mapping between entities and events; in our case, that each car was washed exactly once. Hence focus sensitivity appears to be a property of event or situation quantification, even with D-quantifiers.
Information Structure Effects in the Restrictor: Many and Few
Focus does not only influence D-quantification in the scope of the quantifier, but also in the nuclear scope. This was first pointed out by Herburger 1993 Herburger , 1997 We also can deal with cases of multiple focus spread over the nominal complement of the determiner and the verbal predicate. The resulting meaning is that under the cooks that applied, the number of competent late-appliers was low. (41) a. 'the number of incompetent cooks that applied is higher than expected' b. 'the number of competent cooks that applied is higher than expected'
(40) says that many INCOMPETENT F cooks applied is true iff (41)(a) holds, but (b) does not hold to the same degree. This results in the correct interpretation. The sentence asserts that the number of incompetent ones among the cooks that applied was higher than expected, not that the number of competent cooks that applied was higher than expected.
Herburger 1997 wrongly predicts similar effects for other intersective quantifiers. Focus does not seem to have an influence on truth conditions in (42).
(42) Three INCOMPETENT F cooks applied.
Büring 1996 has the same problem, as the interpretation scheme (39) 
This states that the number of cooks that applied is considerably smaller than to be expected, given the proportion of cooks among the set of alternatives. For example, assume that among the alternative set ⋃⟦COOK F ⟧ f , there are 80% cooks, 10% someliers, and 10% pastry chefs, and that there were 10 applicants, of which 5 were cooks, 4 were someliers, and one, a pastry chef. Under these circumstances, Solt's analysis predicts that Few COOKS F applied is true, as 5 << 0.8 × 10 and Many SOMELIERS F applied is true, as 4 >> 0.1 × 10. This is correct, even though there were more cooks that applied than there were someliers. Notice, also, that (44) represents not a proportional reading, but a cardinal reading of few / many, a point that is argued to be correct by Solt as well.
Information-Structure Effects with Proportional Determiners
Sauerland (2014) also discusses cases in which focus affects the interpretation of Dquantifiers; interestingly, this involves proportional quantifiers that are not intersective like many and few. The phenomenon was first recognized for Korean by Park 2007; related effects are observed in French and (for non-subject quantifiers) in English as in (45) The availability of (47) corresponds to the fact that in (46)(b), the DP 60 Prozent and the NP Frauen seems to be more losely connected, and rather ambiguous as to which constituent forms the head. This structure is made clear with the alternative (48), in which the quantifier is expressed by an adverbial.
to 60 percent have women voted I n (47) the union of the focus meaning can determine the restrictor of the quantificational DP, 60 Prozent. similar as with few in (36): '60 percent of the men or women that voted were women'. In spite of these parallels, it is not clear whether focus sensitivity of many/few and proportional quantifiers is the same phenomenon, given the problems of Herburger's original analysis, and its crucial assumption that the determiners it applies to are intersective, not proportional.
Focus-sensitive Determiners
So far we have investigated focus effects in the scope and the restrictor of nominal quantificational determiners. There are also determiners that appear to be sensitive to the focus within them. Krifka 1999 discusses cases with comparative quantifiers as (49).
(49) a. More than THREE F boys left. b. Less than THREE F boys left.
Classical General Quantifier analysis did not distinguish between the determiners and more than three and four, representing them as λP′λP[#(P⋂P′) > 3] and λP′λP[#(P⋂P′) ≥ 4], respectively. These are truth-functionally equivalent, hence semantically indistinguishable. The reason for the representation of numerals like four as expressing ≥ 4 is to account for the fact that Four boys left is true if more than four boys left; it is only by scalar implicature that this sentence gets the interpretation that exactly four boys left.
(49)(a) lacks the implicature that excludes that more than four boys left, a fact not expected in General Quantifier theory. Krifka proposes that the determiner head, more, binds the set of alternatives introduced by focus, making them unavailable for scalar implicature. This is implemented in a theory in which the numeral three does not form part of the determiner, but is a numeral adjective that applies to sum individuals consisting of three atomic individuals. This provides the correct results for sentences with more than one quantifier, as in More than four girls kissed more than seven boys (in the cumulative reading), and it is extended to quantifiers headed by less or fewer as in (49)(b).
Krifka 1999 applies a similar analysis also for quantifiers headed by at least and at most. Newer work has pointed out that these superlative are different in important respect. Geurts & Nouwen 2007 have argued that they are of a modal nature, and Cohen & Krifka 2011 proposed that they represent quantifications over speech acts. In any case, they also are sensitive to focus, just like comparative quantifiers.
The focus of more than can be broader than the numeral, as in (50).
(50) I ate more than [three APPLES] F -I also ate two pears.
Another case of a determiner that appears to be inherently focusing is German lauter, which is derived from the adjective meaning 'pure' (cf. Eckardt 2002) .
(51) In dem Kasten waren lauter Perlen. in the box were LAUTER pearls 'In the box there were only pearls, and a lot of them.'
In contrast to only (or German nur), lauter is a proper determiner that attaches to nominal expressions (mass and count), but not to names or to other constituents.
Information Structure on Determiners and Quantifiers
The cases discussed so far involved the interaction of determiners and quantifiers and expressions with a special information status, especially focused and given items. We now consider determiners and quantifiers that are themselves focused and/or given.
Focus on Determiners
In (52), the determiner is in focus, and the quantifier is a contrastive topic:
Here, some carries a rising accent, which is often considered to be a special marking for contrastive topics (cf. Chapter 3); here it is understood as indicating alternative topics. As usual, focus indicates alternatives, the alternatives being other quantifiers. The alternatives to some, naturally, are other quantifiers such as all, most, or no. These alternatives are used for the computation of scalar implicatures: If there is an alternative α that leads to a sentence that entails the one that is uttered, but not vice versa, then the sentence with this alternative is implicated to be false. In (52), the sentence All cooks were hired implicates Some cooks were hired, but not the other way round (things are less clear with most). Hence, (52) implicates that not all cooks were hired.
The relevant alternatives in the case of (52) Hence focus data show that there are at two classes of quantification determiners, those that are naturally interpreted as partitive, and those that are not so interpreted.
Topical and Focused Quantifiers
A quantified DP can be in focus, as in the following case: As a consequence, the relation between quantifiers and topicality is certainly less strict than suggested in section 13.1. It is conceivable that quantifiers start out with restrictors that are topics, but then, as DPs, are subjected to general syntactic rules, and as a result occur in other DP positions as well. We would perhaps predict that quantifiers occur first in topic positions in language acquisition, and that quantifiers occur more frequently in topic positions -but this is still unknown.
The information structure status of quantifiers influences their scope. While every guest in (58)(a) can scope over the wh-constituent, leading to a quantification into a question ('For every guest x, what did x bring to the party?'), this is not available in (b) ('For which y does it hold that every guest brought y?').
The scopal behavior can be captured structurally within a framework that assumes that topics occupy syntactic positions that c-command foci, as in the "cartographic" theory of Rizzi 1997. For quantificational phenomena, such phenomena have been treated by Szabocsi 1997, who identifies three pre-verbal positions in Hungarian that differ in their information-structural potential, and can be occupied by different quantificational expressions. The outermost position is reserved for referential DPs, but can also be accessed by quantifiers headed by a legtöbb 'most'. The next position is taken by distributive quantifiers, e.g. DPs headed by minden 'every', and the immediate preverbal position is accessible to "counting" quantifiers headed by e.g kevés 'few' or hatnál több 'more than six'. Sometimes, one and the same DP can occur in distinct positions, leading to distinct interpretations (e.g., 'Mary saw two movies, namely X and Y' vs. 'The number of movies Mary saw was two'). 'During the talk, interestingly, X students slept'
In the position of D, determiners like ein 'a', zwei 'two', einige 'several', viele 'many', die meisten 'most' and perhaps also jeder 'every' are fine, whereas determiners like kein 'no', wenige 'few', weniger als drei 'less than three' or höchstens drei 'at most three' are bad. Quantifiers like mehr als drei 'more than three', genau drei 'exactly three', fast jeder 'nearly every' or mehr als die Hälfte der 'more than half of the' are degraded in the D position.
The first group of quantifiers can be understood as topical, in contrast to the second . The generalization, following Szabolcsi 1997, is that monotone decreasing quantifiers are definitely excluded from the topic position. These are quantifiers like no student, few students and less than three students for which it holds that if D(α)(β) holds, and β′ applies to a subset of β, then D(α)(β′) holds as well -for example, if no student slept, is true, then no student slept and snored is true. Why should this be so? Szabolcsi 1997 invokes the notion of a minimal witness set. A witness set for a quantifier Q is a set W such that Q(β) holds if and only if Q(β⋂W) holds. For example, for every student the minimal witness set is the set of all students, and for three students a minimal witness set is any set that consists of three students. Now, a statement with a topical quantifier can be rephrased as being about such a minimal witness set of the quantifier: [[D students] Ebert 2009 suggests that topical quantifiers have the additional property that rephrasing them as statements about their witness sets does not change their anaphoric potential. This applies to quantifiers like three students, and distinguishes them from quantifiers like every student. The latter quantifier introduces discourse referents with a life span limited to the sentence in which it occurs, whereas its reformulation in terms of statements on minimal witness sets involves discourse referents with unlimited life span.
Topicality has also been invoked to explain the discourse effects of indefinites. Cresti 1995 , as well as Ebert 2009 , have suggested that the wide-scope effects of specific indefinites come about as a result of their topicality.
Conclusion
It was the goal of this article to present the many ways in which quantification interacts with the information-structural features like focus, givenness and topic. I have argued that there is a fundamental connection, insofar as the restrictor of a quantifier can be understood as given. This fact relates to natural-language quantifiers being conservative.
There are different ways how the restrictor can be determined. With adverbial quantifiers, or A-quantification, it is particularly obvious that information-structural features play a major role, be it focus, givenness, or topicality expressed by prosody, syntactic movement, or morphological markings. With nominal quantification, or D-quantification, the restrictor is more rigidly defined by syntactic structure, as the NP complement of the determiner. However, we have seen a variety of exceptions to this rule with the determiners many / few, with proportional determiners, and with focusing determiners, where D-quantification is subject to similar rules as A-quantification. We furthermore have observed that the topichood or focusation of quantifiers themselves can affect their scope, and other aspects of their interpretation.
